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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANTRESPONDENT SURVIVORSHIP BENEFITS.
A.

AppellantTs

FDIC

Retirement

and

FDIC

Survivorship

Benefits are Different and Distinct Programs.
In arguing that retirement benefits provided by the Federal
Government

are

synonymous

with

survivorship

benefits,

the

Respondent refers the Court to Title 5, Section 8311 of United
States Code.

However, the Respondent did not inform the Court

that Section 8311 deals with "Forfeiture of Annuities and Retired
Pay" for various reasons as outlined in the sections thereafter.
In particular,

Subchapter

2 deals with circumstances when a

government employee is convicted of certain offenses, flees the
jurisdiction

to

avoid

prosecution,

participates

in

falsifying

refuses

employment

to

testify

applications.

and
(See

generally 5 USCS Section 8312-15).
Instead of referring the Court to Title 5, Section 8311
through 22 as outlined in Respondent's Brief, reference should be
made to Title 5, Section 8231 through 51 which is Subchapter 3 of
the Section dealing explicitly with "Civil Service Retirement."
The references to the earlier section has no applicability to the
issues in dispute in this matter.

1

Appellant has cited
Chapter

1 which

from

comprises

5 Code of Federal Regulations,

the working

Title 5, Section 8331 through 8351.

documents

interpreting

There is simply nothing in

the Respondent's Brief which refutes clear citations to the Code
of

Federal

Regulations

which

differentiate

retirement and FDIC retirement benefits.

between

FDIC

(See pages 9-11 of

Appellant's Brief).
B.

Survivorship Benefits were not Awarded to Respondent in

the Amended Decree.
Respondent

argues, based

upon

"Exhibit

7"

(attached

as

Exhibit A to Appellee's Brief), offered at the time of trial,
that the trial court had equitable power with regard to the
entire

"Retirement Program" of the Government

should

construe

survivorship

the

term

benefits

"Retirement

which

were

and this Court

Program"

not

as

explicitly

including
or

even

implicitly outlined in the Decree.
If one reads page 3 of "Exhibit 7" offered at the time of
trial, attached is Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief, under the
heading "Providing for your Survivors on Retirement", it is hard
to believe that paragraph 8 of the Amended Decree was meant to
reach survivorship benefits.

Paragraph 8 does not explicitly

list survivorship benefits, does not decide the question as to
rights of survivorship benefits between the Respondent and any
2

future wives, does not designate the amount of the survivor
benefits, or deal with any of the contingencies and requirements
of federal law as set out in Appellant's Brief.
Probably the best indication that the trial court did not
mean to award to the Defendant/Respondent survivorship benefits
can be obtained from the trial court's actual wording at the time
the oral decision was made:
As to the retirement program, I am going to follow the
suggestion made in Woodward, and that is, that the
defendant be awarded 1/2 of the payments to come from
the retirement program at the time the plaintiff
either terminates or obtains his retirement benefits
from the program; based upon the numerator of 13 over
the total- number of years he worked with the
government.
So if it is 13/20ths of that sum, that
will be sum for determining how much the 1/2 will apply
to. (emphasis added)
(R. 164.)
The wording outlined above could not be meant to apply to
benefits

that would be payable

after the

Plaintiff/Appellant

died. The payments that were intended were those payments to be
made upon retirement which would include the normal annuity and
not a death benefit.
C.
Filing

The Court may not Modify the Amended Decree without the
of

a Petition

and

Requisite

Showing

of

a Change of

Circumstances.
Respondent, in her Brief, simply contends that the Court
already

awarded

her

a

retirement
3

benefit

and

therefore,

enforcement of the Decree was proper by the means of an Order to
Show Cause.

There is no question that the need for the filing of

a petition to modify rests upon the decision of whether the
survivorship benefits were included in the Decree of Divorce.
However, it is respectfully submitted that based upon Title
5

of

the

U.S.

Code

and

the

interpreting

Code

of

Federal

Regulations, there is no question that retirement benefits and
survivor benefits are separate, and it is clear from the terms of
the Amended Decree and from the trial judge's own language that
survivorship benefits, more akin to life insurance, were never
discussed or argued by counsel and were not awarded by the trial
court.
Based thereon, Respondent does not deny that the Rules of
Procedure
failure

and

to

interpreting

file

a

Petition

case

law

indicate

is

fatal

to

clearly

a request

that
for a

modification of a Decree of Divorce.
D.

Federal

Regulations

and Law Preclude

the Award of

Survivorship Benefits to the Defendant/Respondent.
It is generally acknowledged that Federal law directs the
distribution of civil service survivor annuities and State law
identifies
relationships

the

familial

should

relationships

be interpreted.

upon

the

See Money v. Office of

Personnel Management, 811 F.2d 1474 (CAFC, 1987).

4

which

There is no

question that 5 CFR subpart F, Sections 831.601 through 831.629
mandate that survivorship benefits could only be awarded to the
Defendant/Respondent if the Plaintiff/Appellant's present spouse
gives her consent, and secondly, only if the Defendant/Respondent
had not remarried before age 55.
To counter that argument, Respondent contends that although
she

has

remarried,

federal

legislation

allows

the

survivor

annuity to be reinstated if she becomes divorced, annulled or
widowed. Citing Title 5, Section 8341(g).

Again, counsel has

failed to properly interpret the federal statutes.

Title 5,

Section 3141(g) deals with a "surviving spouse", and does allow a
person qualifying as a "surviving spouse" to have his or her
survivor annuity reinstated upon divorce, annulment or death.

A

surviving spouse is the spouse of the person at the time he or
she dies and is not

"the former spouse," which position the

Defendant/Respondent fills in this particular case.

See Title 5,

Section 8341(a), Title 5, Section 8331(23); Title 5, Section
8341(e)(1).
Again,

Defendant/Respondent

sections

regarding

becoming

55

and

has cited

the

inappropriate

a surviving

spouse

who

then has that

status

terminated

annulment or divorce.

remarries

before

by death,

There is nothing in the Code or in the

Code of Federal Regulations which gives that same right of a

5

surviving
before

spouse

age

to

55.

Code

"former

The

d i s s o l v e d by d e a t h ,
the

a

fact

that

her

who has

become

marriage

is

d i v o r c e or annulment does n o t ,

provisions

Plaintiff/Appellant,

spouse"

researched

reactivate

her

by

ultimately
under any of

counsel

right

to

married

the

for

the

survivor

annuity.
If one reads Title 5, Section 8341(g), relied upon by the
Defendant/Respondent, "former spouse" is explicitly dealt with.
That part of the section states as follows:
. . . A former spouse of the deceased employee, member,
annuiant or former member who is separated from service
with tible to a deferred annuity under Section 8338(b)
of this Title, is entitled to survivor annuity under
this subsection if and to the extent expressly provided
for in an election under Section 8339(j)(3) of this
Title, or in the terms of any decree of divorce or
annulment, or any court order or court-approved
settlement agreement incident to such decree.
There is nothing contained in Title 5, Section 8339(j) (3)
which allows the annuity to a former spouse, once she has been
remarried, and thereby becomes ineligible for the annuity, to
reactivate that annuity if the marriage becomes dissolved by
divorce, annulment or death.
E.

The Issue is Moot.

Respondent,

in her Brief,

acknowledges

as follows as

contained on page 14 of the Respondent's Brief:
The Defendant admits that it appears at the
6

present time that she may not be entitled to a
survivor's annuity because of her remarriage . . . .
Of course, the position of the Respondent outlined in the
previous

point

is

that

if

at

some

future

time

the

Plaintiff/Respondent

is divorced, annulled or is widowed, she

will

to

then

be

able

take

advantage

of

illustrated previously, that is erroneous.

the

annuity.

As

Regardless of whether

the annuity may be reinstated or not, there is no question at
present time that the Defendant/Respondent is not eligible for
the annuity and the issue is moot.
The appellate courts for the State of Utah has been active
with regard to the issue of "mootness."

The Supreme Court dealt

with the issue in Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980).

In

Hoyle, supra, the Court held:
. . . A further fundamental rule is that the courts do
not busy themselves with advisory opinions, nor is it
within the province to exercise the delicate power of
pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in abstract,
hypothetical or otherwise moot cases.
It has been
found to be far wiser, and it has become settled as a
general principle that a constitutional question is not
to be reached if the merits of the case at hand may be
fairly determined on other than constitutional issues.
Id. at 242.
See also State v. Stromquist, 639 P.2d 171 (Utah 1981).
In Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Associates, 646 P.2d 731 (Utah
1982), the Court noted as follows:

7

The strong judicial policy against giving advisory
opinions dictates the Court's refrain from adjudicating
moot cases. [citing cases)] . . . Once a controversy
has become moot, a trial court should enter an order of
dismissal.
Id. at 732-733.

See also Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166 (Utah

1981).
The

Court

reiterated

its

position

Financial Corp., 656 P. 2d 409 (Utah 1982).

in

Black

v.

Alpha

In that action, the

court stated as follows:
. Since the buyer did not take that route, but
instead paid the contract balance and received the
conveyance of the property, all controversy between the
parties was settled and mooted.
Judicial policy
dictates against our rendering and advisory position,
[citing cases]. We recently stated in Duran v. Morris,
Utah, 635 P. 2d 43, 45 (1981) "that the requested
judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the
litigants, the case is moot and the court will normally
refrain from adjudicating it on the merits." [citing
cases].
Id. at 410-411.
The definition of mootness as outlined in Black, supra is
particularly suited to the facts of this case.
the

Defendant/Respondent

is named

Whether or not

for survivorship benefits,

cannot possibly affect the rights of the litigants inasmuch as
Federal

law clearly dictates that the Respondent

is now not

eligible for survivorship benefits from the Appellant.
The only exception recognized in Utah law to reviewing moot
issues is set out in Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981).
8

The exception outlined in that case does not apply to the facts
in this matter. It is respectfully submitted that the claim of
the Respondent is moot and not entitled to judicial review and
that

the order

relating

to survivorship

benefits

should be

stricken.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FURTHER ORDERS
WITH REGARD TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTfS RETIREMENT
It is the Plaintiff/Appellant's contention that the Order
entered by Judge Moffat in this case in paragraph 1 of the Order
signed by him on May 29, 1990 was error.

The entire excerpt from

the Order is contained in Point II, page 19 of the Appellant's
Brief.

In summary, however, the District Court ordered the

Plaintiff, Mr. Adelman, to assign on or before October 1, 1989
one-h£lf of his FDIC retirement benefits.

The contention of the

Appellant is that everything that the law requires in assigning
to the Defendant/Respondent the appropriate retirement benefits
was in fact undertaken and completed prior to the bringing the
Order to Show Cause.

The Plaintiff/Appellant's complaint is that

the Defendant/Respondent did not disclose to the Court at the
hearing of the Order to Show Cause in this matter that in fact,
nearly one year prior to the signing of the Affidavit in support
of the Order to Show Cause, the governmental entities had been

9

provided with all of the relevant and necessary information to
record her interest in the Plaintiff's retirement.
Appellant
Government

and

documented
the

parties

all

of

the

on pages

letters
19

through

between

the

23 of

the

Appellant's Brief.
In summary, the Federal law requires that a statement signed
by the spouse seeking payments, or his/her attorney be submitted
to the Government with the relevant information to record her
interest in the retirement program.

By letter dated April 14,

1988, the Defendant/Respondent, who was the person seeking the
payments,- sent all of the required information.

(R. 222-24)

The

Order to Show Cause was unnecessary with regard to the issue of
the recording Defendant's retirement benefits, and in fact was
brought in bad faith because the Defendant/Respondent knew that
the proper action had been taken on April 14, 1988, nearly 10
months before she signed the Affidavit in support of the Order to
Show Cause on July 28, 1989 (R. 233-36) in which she stated in
paragraph 5 thereof as follows:
The Plaintiff has refused and failed to provide proof
to the Defendant that he has designated her either as a
beneficiary of the retirement program or for
survivorship benefits under the retirement program.
In reviewing the $1,000.00 award of attorney's fees made by
the trial court in this matter, and in reviewing attorney's fees
on appeal, the Court should keep in mind that the entire point
10

relative to the Plaintiff/Appellantfs compliance with the prior
Order, and the need for an Order to Show Cause on this issue and
the necessary

research

and submission to this Court was all

unnecessary and a waste of time and effort.
What is more disturbing than the judicial waste, is the fact
that paragraph

7 of the trial court entered

in this matter

essentially ties up the Plaintiff/Appellantfs equity in the home
and property until he complies with all of the orders made by
Judge Moffat, one of which was an order which had been complied
with ten months before. (R. 427-28)
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT FOR UNREIMBURSED
MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES.
A.

The

Decree

and Amended

Decree

Required

Only

that

Plaintiff Maintain Insurance on the Minor Children.
There is absolutely no refutation contained in Respondent's
Brief to the fact that the Divorce Decree required only the
maintenance of health and accident insurance for the benefit of
the minor children and was silent with regard to unreimbursed
expenses.
As discussed hereinafter, Respondent refers to a number of
Utah Code provisions that were in force and effect at the time
the Divorce Decree was entered, which Respondent argues gives the
11

Court

the

right

to grant

judgment

for unreimbursed

medical

expenses incurred prior to the date of any petition seeking to
modify the Decree.

It should be noted, however, that the Order

to Show Cause, with its Affidavit, and all pleadings heretofore
filed in this case have relied upon only the Decree and Amended
Decree as a source of relief as it relates to medical expenses,
and none of the documents filed by the Defendant/Respondent have
referred to the alternate Code provisions.
Respondent does not dispute that the award of alimony and
child support made in this case took into account the claim of
the

Defendant/Respondent

children.

for medical

expenses

of

the

minor

There is simply no response to the contention of the

Appellant that the Court in its award of alimony, child support
and the other provisions took into account the expenses outlined
on the Defendant's Financial Declarations, as documented in the
Appellant's Brief, which included amounts for medical and dental
expenses.
B.

The Court did not have Jurisdiction to Modify a Decree

of Divorce.
The Appellant has tried to document carefully the rules and
case law requiring the filing of a petition to modify a decree
before an amendment to that decree may be made.

The Respondent

contends that the Court did not have to modify the Decree to
12

retroactively grant judgment for unreimbursed medical, dental and
related expenses because of alternate Code provisions that were
in existence at the time of the Amended Decree in this matter.
The first statute relied upon by the Respondent is 78-45-3
(1978, as amended) which states as follows:
Every man shall support his child; and he shall support
his wife when she is in need.
I Defendant/Respondent does not cite any authority allowing
the Court to rely upon that section, to retroactively modify a
Decree of Divorce and impose upon the noncustodial father, the
obligation of paying one-half of unreimbursed medical and dental
expenses of the minor children since 1982, a time prior to the
actual entry of the Decree of Divorce.

The Amended Decree of

Divorce in this case was not entered until 1985.

(R. 195-99)

In reviewing the cases discussed in Utah Code Annotated, 7845-3

(1978,

as amended),

that

section

is used only

as the

rudimentary authority upon which the right of the Court to assess
child support is based.
Appellant

rely

upon

No cases reviewed by counsel for the
that

Code

section

as

authority

for

retroactive modification of a decree or as a basis to impose
obligations in addition to child support upon a noncustodial
parent retroactively.
(Utah App. 1988) at 73.

See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P. 2d 69
See also Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253

13

(Utah 1987) at 256; Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah
1985) at 394.
The issue has long been put to rest by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Karren v. State Department of Social Services,
716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986).

In that case, the court stated:

Plaintiff's second claim is that even when a court
modifies an existing support obligation, the
modification cannot be applied retroactively, but only
prospectively. In Larsen v. Larsen, Utah 561 P.2d 1077
(1977), the trial court dismissed a motion for
retroactive child support finding that a prior order
could not be modified to apply to periods in the past,
no matter what the circumstances may have been since
the divorce decree. This court affirmed, holding that
alimony and support payments become unalterable debts
as they accrue, preventing change or modification after
periodic installments have become due.
Id. at 1079.
Thus, only prospective modification of a support
obligation is proper. See also Bernard v. Attebury,
Utah 629 P.2d 892 (1981).
Id. at 813.
It was in response to the Court's decision in Karren that
the legislature amended the statutory provisions and included
Utah

Code

Annotated

30-3-10.6(2)

(1989,

as

amended) which

provides as follows:
A child or spousal support payment under a child
support order may be modified with respect to any
period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition
was given to the obligee, if the obligor's the
petitioner, or to the obligor if the obligee's the
petitioner.

14

It is respectfully submitted that aside from the fact that
Respondent does not claim any interpreting case law from Utah
Code Annotated 78-45-3 (1978, as amended), justifying the Court's
order, there is a plethora of case law and statutory language
which clearly indicated that it is not.
The next authority relied upon by the Defendant/Respondent
is Utah Code Annotated, 78-45-7.1 (1990) which states in relevant
part as follows:
When no prior court order exists, or the prior court
order makes no specific provision for the payment of
medical and dental expenses for dependent children, the
court in its order: (1) shall include a provision
assigning responsibility for the payment of responsible
and necessary medical and dental expenses for the
dependent children; and (2) may include a provision
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate
health, hospital or dental care for those children if
the insurance coverage is or becomes at a reasonable
cost.
I
As with the interpretation of Federal statutes affecting
this case, counsel for Defendant/Respondent has omitted in its
discussion

of

that

section

the preamble.

As noted

in the

Appellant's Brief, the fact that Utah Code Annotated Section 7845-71.1 requires

at a modification hearing, the inclusion of

medical and dental expenses as a consideration with regard to
child

support

and

related

in issues, does not

relieve

the

Respondent from filing a petition and establishing the change of

15

circumstances

concerning

the parties.

Utah Code Annotated,

Section 78-47-7.2(b) states as follows:
Neither the enactment of the guidelines, nor any
consequent impact of the guidelines on existing child
support orders, constitute a substantial and material
change in circumstances as a ground for modification of
the court orders existing prior July 1, 1989.
In essence, the guidelines specifically provide that when
the Court hears the matter

for modification,

it must, if a

petition has been filed and a change of circumstances found,
include a provision relating to medical and dental expenses for
the dependent children. However, that clause as clearly outlined
in the above language cannot be used as establishing a change of
circumstance or reason to modify the decree.

Neither can Utah

Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.1 be used as a basis for allowing
retroactive modification of a decree of divorce.
Respondent then cites Utah Code Annotated, 30-2-9 and 30-35.

Both of those sections deal with the fact that the expenses

of the family and the education of the children is chargeable
upon both the husband and wife, and further, that the Court has
equitable

power with

regard

to all of the issues

involving

children.

However, those sections as with Utah Code Annotated,

78-45-3 simply do not provide the specific rights for the trial
court to retroactively modify the decree of divorce and in fact

16

award judgment for matters that existed at the time the divorce
decree was entered.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED WITH REGARD TO THE ACCOUNTING
ON THE MARITAL HOME AND PROPERTY
The first error that Appellant claimed with regard to the
Court Order regarding

the marital home and property was the

failure to award interest.

In that regard, the Appellant cited

from Judge Davidson's opinion in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d
199 (Utah App. 1987), which explicitly states:
Therefore, we hold that the trial judge erred in not
awarding interest on the property award in an amount of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, (footnote omitted) As
previously stated, plaintiff's award of defendant's
retirement fund was to accrue interest at the rate of
eight percent (8%) per annum.
If the award had been
correct, it too should have accrued interest at the
statutory rate.
Id. at 207.

The Respondent does not argue that the Appellate

Court has resolved the issue of interest, but argues that in fact
the Plaintiff/Appellant agreed that interest would not accrue on
his equity.

The Court on page 20 of Respondent's Brief, will

find a reference to the Record at pages 290-293 which is the
Affidavit of Mary Lynch signed on October 30, 1989.
provision

is paragraph

4 of her Affidavit

follows:
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The relevant

which

states as

When the Plaintiff asked me not to sell the property
after my marriage, I agreed to consider his proposal
only on the condition that he not receive interest on
his equity and that he prepare a written proposal. (R.
291. )
There is nothing in her paragraph 4 that indicates that the
Plaintiff agreed to do anything, but only what the Defendant's
position was.
through

287.

The next reference to the record is at pages 261
That

reference

includes

a group

of

letters

encompassing much information which is totally irrelevant to the
clause

for

which

it was

cited.

The

reference

refers

to

correspondence between the Defendant and that Government with
regard to retirement benefits, and then letters by the Defendant
to Plaintiff's lawyer and the Judge, and finally, an Affidavit
from Joan Killpack at Merrill Title Company (Record 285-286).
None

of

that

agreement

information

on behalf

of

referred

the

to comprises

any type of

Plaintiff, Mr. Adelman, waiving

interest.
From
Plaintiff,

a reference

to

agreements

Defendant/Respondent

then

allegedly
quotes

made

by

Bettinger

the
v.

Bettinger, 134 Utah Adv. 20 (Utah App. 1990), as being applicable
to the facts of this case.

The Amended Decree of Divorce in this

case clearly stated that upon one of several conditions, one
being

the

Defendant's

remarriage, the

$34,636.00 was to be paid:
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Plaintiff's

equity of

In full at the time of the happening of the first of
the foregoing events, less costs of sale or refinancing
in order to repay him, which costs should be borne
equally with the Defendant. Defendant is given leave
to refinance the home and will borrow money against it
as she sees fit, provided, that Plaintiff's abovestated equity interests be in position second only to
the present outstanding $20,000 mortgage.
(R. 197-98)
In Bettinger, supra, the decree of divorce upon which the
Court of Appeals made its decision stated as follows:
Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the marriage
in the form a home . . . subject to a lien thereon for
1/2 of the equity that may be in the house at the time
of liquidation (which contemplates an increase in
equity as the value increases). The equity is defined
as the fair market value or sales value at the time the
defendant becomes entitled to liquidate this lien as
set forth herein, less the amount of the mortgages,
costs of improvement made by the plaintiff and costs of
sale.
This lien shall not be foreclosed until the
youngest child reaches 18, or until the home is sold,
or until plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence of any
of these events, 2/3rds of the house payment then may
be converted to child support and that sum shall be
paid to plaintiff on a monthly basis as additional
child support.
Id. at 20-21.
As provided

above, the explicit

language of the decree

allowed the equity to be determined on the basis of the fair
market value or sales price at the time Defendant became entitled
to

liquidate

his

lien.

The

subject

provision

involves

an

explicit finding by the Court as to the Plaintiff's equity and an
explicit time as to the time it was to be paid him.
19

In Bettinger, the house sold in July 1987 and the proceeds
were divided according to the formula outlined by the court.

It

was on the basis that the court found that the defendant's right
to his portion of the equity was upon the time of sale, July
1987, but the court ruled:
Finally defendant contends he is entitled to interest
on his equity from the time his lien was due and
payable.
Since we found that his equity was to be
determined as of July 1987, the sale date, the claim is
moot.
Id. at 22.
In this case, the unambiguous language of the Divorce Decree
recites that the Plaintiff/Appellant is to receive his interest
on

the

first

Defendant's

occurring

remarriage.

event

which

Therefore,

Marchant, supra is controlling.

in
the

this

case

Court's

was

holding

the
in

The Court in Bettinger, is not

inconsistent with Marchant, but simply a different ruling based
upon a finding that equity was to be paid at the time of sale as
opposed to this case, upon the first occurring event which was in
this case, the Defendant's remarriage.
The

other

case

cited

by

Respondent

is

Osguthorpe

Osquthorpe, 131 Utah Adv. Rpts. 21 (Utah App. 1990).
reliance of Respondent is misplaced.

v.

Again, the

In Osguthorpe, supra, the

defendant was contending that his father had made gifts to him
during the marriage including an $18,500 loan on the Chris Lane
20

home.

Because defendant's father testified that the gifts were

intended for his son (the defendant) and not the parties jointly,
defendant claims that the court should have awarded him those
interests.

Id. at 23.

The Court then analyzed the various cases

relating to the issue of whether a gift or inheritance during
the marriage to one particular spouse should be awarded to that
spouse outside of the marital estate.

The court found that the

trial court orders that the cash gifts were intended for both
parties was not

clearly

erroneous.

It is on that

factual

scenario that the court then deals with the interest question.
The court affirmed the trial court's award to defendant of a noninterest bearing equitable lien on the parties' home.
It

can

clearly

be

understood

why

the

court

Id. at 24.

in Osguthorpe,

determined the defendant's equity in the home to be an equitable
interest as opposed to legal interest.
the

Court

has

awarded

a

fixed

represent a lien on the property.

amount

In this case, however,
which

amount was

to

The facts of this case are

very closely aligned with the court's decision in Marchant v.
Marchant, supra.

In Marchant, the court held:

c o . We stated the specific language of Section 15-1-4
applies to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 30-35(1) (1984) whereby the trial court enters orders "in
relation to the children, property and parties . . . "
Therefore, we hold that the trial judge erred in not
awarding interest on the property awarded in the amount
of 12% per annum . . . .
21

Id. at 207.
It is respectfully submitted that the clear language of the
Amended

Decree

together

with

interpreting

case

law

clearly

mandates that the Plaintiff/Appellantf s equity in the home and
property bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the
date of Defendant/Respondent's remarriage.
The second claimed error by the Appellant relates to the
Court Order that the equity not be paid to the Plaintiff until he
demonstrates compliance with the terms of the Order.

Inasmuch as

no response is made in the Respondent's Brief to the impropriety
of the Court's Order, no additional information will be included
in this Brief.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED WITH REGARD TO THE AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS CASE
In

response

to

the

Appellant's

Brief,

the

Respondent

contends that the cases and authority outlined by Appellant are
not applicable because the awards of attorney's fees dealt with
in the cases cited by the Appellant were divorce proceedings and
not orders relating to the failure to comply with the terms of
the Decree of Divorce.

It is respectfully submitted that all of

the

in Point V of Appellant's

authorities

applicable

cited

to the award of

attorney's

22

fees in any

Brief

are

facet of

divorce proceedings. The petitioning party must show need and an
inability to pay.
Additionally, there must be proof relative to the amount of
attorney's fees, the fact that the fees were related to the
action, and that they were reasonable in the community.

There is

absolutely no refutation of the fact that the Affidavit signed
by

counsel

in

this

case

(Record

288-89),

where

there

is

substantiation for 15 hours in performing various types of work,
but the Affidavit does not state how much time was spent on each
particular

aspect

which

included

client

conferences,

ctorrespondence to the Plaintiff before the Order to Show Cause,
correspondence to Plaintiff's counsel before the Order to Show
Cause,

preparation

of

stipulations

and

orders

pursuant

negotiations and conferences with the title company.

to

Many of

those items are unrelated to the Order to Show Cause. There is no
delineation

as to

the

amount

of

hours

spent

on

each, and

therefore, it is impossible to substantiate any of the $1,000
that counsel requests.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should grant the
relief prayed for in Appellant's originating Brief.
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